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I. INTRODUCTION
In a quiet room at Howard University Hospital, there is a
healthy, 7-month-old baby who has spent her entire life there.
The mother smoked crack cocaine during her pregnancy and
abandoned the child a few days after she was born, leaving
hospital officials an address for the child's grandmother, who
already had three of the woman's children. After months of
being unable to locate the mother, the hospital staff realized
last month that the woman had returned as a patient. When
social workers confronted her, the mother gave no reason for
abandoning the baby, made no apologies and signed papers
making her daughter a ward of the city.'
This excerpt from a front page article in the September 11, 1989, issue
of The Washington Post highlights the sense of wreckless abandon with
which crack-cocaine mothers abandon their new-born infants with little
or no concern.2 As a result, local hospitals become ad hoc orphanages and
"the only safety net for children who are sometimes abandoned before
they are named.
'3
There is grave concern that the cocaine babies of today will have
suffered such a marked degree of irreparable dysfunctional development
during the first twelve weeks of their fetal development that within a
few years they will emerge as a "bio-underclass.
4
* B.S., J.D., Indiana University; LL.M. Columbia University. Professor of Law,
The Catholic University of America.
1 Green, "Boarder Babies" Linger in Hospitals: Drug Users Abandon Their
Babies, Wash. Post, Sept. 11, 1989, at 1, col. 1.
2 Id.
3Id.
4Milloy, A Time Bomb in Cocaine Babies, Wash. Post, Sept. 17, 1989, at B3,
col. 4.
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Already, a few of them are turning up in first-and-second-grade
classrooms around the country, wreaking havoc on themselves
and others. Severe emotional damage and even physical de-
formities not so readily apparent today may mushroom in the
near future.5
While these children "will know nothing of their addiction at an intel-
lectual level, at a neurochemical level, their brains will never forget
cocaine,' 6 and with age, in fact, they become prime candidates for drug
abuse.'
The dimensions of fetal abuse are simply staggering." There are in-
dications that drug abuse during pregnancy is more prevalent than pre-
viously thought. These women have shown a complete absence of concern
and responsibility for their newborn babies. The law must respond by
imposing liability for such actions - preferably re-education and reha-
bilitation; but, in certain cases, civil damages, imprisonment and even
sterilization.
In the past, the doctrine of parental immunity would have precluded
such actions. The doctrine is founded upon the policy that a parent should
be immunized from legal responsibility for his or her tortious conduct
toward children within a family unit.9 This doctrine must be abolished
by the states; the American Law Institute has already rejected parental
immunity as a viable doctrine. 10 Parental immunity should no longer be
viewed as a shield from civil liability for the irresponsible and grossly
negligent biological parent, specifically, the drug addicted natural or sur-
rogate mother who causes injury to an infant."
The purpose of this essay is to demonstrate the pressing need of the
law to take decisive action in imposing tort liability for willful and ma-
licious conduct by drug addicted women during their pregnancy.12 Lia-




8 Norris, Wider Drug Abuse During Pregnancy Indicated, Wash. Post, Sept. 18,
1989, at A6, col. 1.
During the first half of 1989, the infant mortality rate in the District of Co-
lumbia increased by nearly fifty percent - this being attributed to the surge of
cocaine addicted women giving birth. This revelation means that District of Co-
lumbia babies are dying at a rate more than triple the national average of 9.9
deaths per 1,000 in 1988. Abramowitz, Infant Mortality Here: Mothers' Crack Use
Blamed in Increase of Nearly 5%, Wash. Post, Sept. 30, 1989, at 1, col. 6.
9 Hollister, Parent-Child Immunity: A Doctrine in Search of Justification, 50
FoRDHAM L. REv. 489 (1982). W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D OWEN, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 904 passim (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER
& KEETON].
10 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G (1977). The doctrine of parental
immunity was abrogated by the American Law Institute in 1977.
11 Allen, Torts Are Taking Over for Morality, Wall St. J., June 4, 1989, at 10,
col. 4. See also Stearns, Maternal Duties During Pregnancy: Toward a Conceptual
Framework, 21 NEW ENG. L. REV. 595 (1986).
12 See generally Comment, Parent-Child Immunity: The Case for Abolition, 6
SAN DIEo L. REv. 286 (1969).
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tarians that the enforcement of such a policy would most assuredly give
rise to "prenatal police patrols.'
13
Fetal abuse should be recognized both as a criminal and civil wrong.
It is a crime because the state and society have a responsibility to guar-
antee that the civil liberties of all recognizable or viable citizens - re-
gardless of age - be respected.1 4 Just as general obligations are imposed
upon all individuals to refrain from harming infants after their birth, so
too must society impose similar obligations to assure that a mother's
prenatal actions are consistent with this duty to protect children.' 5
The limits of a legal policy consistent with imposing postbirth sanc-
tions would necessarily be shaped by a balancing test that weighs "the
gains to children relative to the harms that might arise from such a
policy. ' 16 ,
Using the balancing test, the argument against use of post-
birth civil or criminal sanctions would have to be that the
possibility of error in assigning responsibility and determining
causation is so great, and the chances that women would be
unfairly treated so substantial, that egregiously culpable be-
havior by pregnant women should go unpunished .... 17
II. PARENTAL IMMUNITY IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
In 1891, the Mississippi Supreme Court first enunciated the principle
of parental immunity for tortious conduct directed towards a child within
the family.18 ,19 In Hewellette v. George, the court reasoned:
So long as the parent is under obligations to care for, guide,
and control, and the child is under a reciprocal obligation to
aid and comfort and obey, no such action as this can be main-
tained. The peace of society, and of the families composing
society, and a sound public policy, designed to subserve the
repose of families and the best interests of society, forbid to the
minor child a right to appear in court in the assertion of a claim
to civil redress for personal injuries suffered at the hands of
the parent.
20
'3 Allen, supra note 11.
14 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 161 (1973).
The compelling point at which the state's legitimate interest in protecting
potential life is at viability. Id. at 163. Viability is normally recognized at about
seven months (twenty-eight weeks) - the third trimester - but may occur as
early as twenty-four weeks. Id. at 160 (per Blackmun, J.).
11 Robertson & Paltrow, 'Fetal Abuse': Should We Recognize It as a Crime?, 75
A.B.A.J., Aug. 1989, at 38 (each author presenting opposite viewpoints on this
issue).
16 Id.
17 Id. See also Note, Developing Maternal Liability Standards for Prenatal In-
jury, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 592 (1987); Curriden, Roe v. Wade Does Not Prevent
Criminal Prosecution of Prenatal Child Abuse, 76 A.B.A.J. 51 (1990).
18 Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
'9 Hollister, supra note 9, at 494. The reasoning behind this decision in turn
formed the underlying policy for advancing the doctrine itself in all but eight
states.
20 68 Miss. at 711, 9 So. at 887.
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While the Hewellette court grounded its decision on the need for so-
cietal tranquility, other courts and writers have emphasized the concern
for family unity,21 parental respect 22 and family discipline.23 Yet another
concern is the effect of liability insurance. The presence of liability in-
surance could lead to fraudulent, collusive and/or friendly suits since a
parent might encourage a minor child to maintain an action because of
the existence of insurance coverage.
24
The recent trend, however, is to reject the doctrine of parental im-
munity.25 In 1977, the American Law Institute abrogated the general tort
immunity between parent and child by declaring:
(1) A parent or child is not immune from tort liability to the
other solely by reason of that relationship.
(2) Repudiation of general tort immunity does not establish
liability for an act or omission that, because of the parent-child
relationship, is otherwise privileged or is not tortious.
26
Seizing upon the initiative of the American Law Institute, a substantial
majority of states have followed in this direction by partially or totally
abandoning the doctrine of parental immunity.
2 7
21 See, e.g., Black v. Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634, 639 (Me. 1979); Sorensen v. Soren-
sen, 369 Mass. 350, 352, 339 N.E.2d 907, 909 (1975).
2 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, at 905.
Hollister, supra note 9, at 504.
Some courts have also mistakenly developed an analogy between interspousal
immunity and parental immunity by drawing upon the common law that rec-
ognized husband and wife as one indivisible unit and thus preventing a wife from
maintaining a legal action against her husband. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
9, at 901-02. Children were not, however, held as parental extensions and have
been allowed to sue their parents in tort to protect their property rights. See
Petersen v. City & County of Honolulu, 51 Haw. 484, 487, 462 P.2d 1007, 1009
(1969).
2 Dennis v. Walker, 284 F. Supp. 413, 415 (D.D.C. 1968).
2 Comment, supra note 12, at 295-96. See Dzenutis v. Dzenutis, 200 Conn. 290,
512 A.2d 130 (1986); Hale v. Hale, 312 Ky. 867, 230 S.W.2d 610 (1950); Villaret
v. Villaret, 169 F.2d 677, 678 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 859G (1979).
27 Twelve states have either abrogated the doctrine or declined to adopt it:
Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal.3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971); Rousey v.
Rousey, 528 A.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc); Petersen v. City & Council of
Honolulu, 51 Haw. 484, 462 P.2d 1007 (1969); Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d
595 (Mich. 1980); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (1974); Briere v.
Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966); Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434,
245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969); Kirchner v. Crystal, 15 Ohio St.3d 326,
474 N.E.2d 275 (1984); Winn v. Gilroy, 296 Or. 718, 681 P.2d 776 (1984); Falco
v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971); Elam v. Elam, 275 S.C. 132, 268
S.E.2d 109 (1980); Wood v. Wood, 135 Vt. 119, 370 A.2d 191 (1977).
Eleven additional states have abrogated the doctrine in specific instances of
automobile negligence: Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967); Streenz v.
Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 471 P.2d 282 (1970); Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 227 Kan.
758, 611 P.2d 135 (1980); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Royle, 202 Mont. 173, 656 P.2d
820 (1983); Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364 (N.D. 1967); Silva v. Silva, 446 A.2d
1013 (R.I. 1982); Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d 190 (1971); Merrick
v. Sutterlin, 93 Wash.2d 411, 610 P.2d 891 (1980); Lee v. Comer, 159 W. Va. 585,
224 S.E.2d 721 (1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572c (Supp. 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1-539.21 (1983).
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One court's rejection of this doctrine illustrates the competing con-
cerns at stake.28 In Rousey v. Rousey,29 the court held that the doctrine
of parental immunity was but an outdated idea set and developed on
inaccurate premises.30 "We see it as a vestige of an era in which children
were without legal protection from the wrongs of their parents, and mar-
ried women were without legal rights, subordinate to their husbands, all
in the name of family harmony."31 However, the Rousey court acknowl-
edged that certain types of conduct maybe either "privileged or not-tor-
tious consistent with [Section 895G of the Restatement] but that this
decision must be done on case-by-case basis. '32 And, obviously, such a
posture would be shaped by a simple balancing test measuring the costs
versus the benefits of applying the rule itself.
33
Interestingly, Judge Nebeker, who dissented in Rousey, emphasized
his fear of the dissolution of the family unit as a result of the pressure
on children to sue one or both parents. Judge Nebeker claimed that if
such litigation were permitted, it would "strain the moral fiber which
holds families together. '34 The Rousey decision would not fulfill the ma-
jority's hope of restoring family concord by insulating the family "from
offspring suits ... because insurance will eliminate true adversity.
'35
Judge Nebeker asserted that the majority decision would in fact "foster
collusion. '36 The Rousey court admitted the fact that the possibility of
fraud exists to one extent or other in every case. However, the majority
stressed that the possibility of parents and children conspiring together
against the insurance carrier did not justify the total denial of recovery
to all minor children.
37
When an actionable offense is committed between a parent and an
unemancipated child, the challenge to the family relationship has already
occurred. To prohibit reparation for the offense can hardly be regarded
as a fortifying or harmonious step in rebuilding familial unity and tran-
In automobile negligence cases where the parent has liability insurance, five
states have abrogated the parental immunity doctrine: Williams v. Williams, 369
A.2d 669 (Del. 1976); Ard v. Ard, 414 So.2d 1066 (Fla. 1982); Farmers Ins. Group
v. Reed, 109 Idaho 849, 712 P.2d 550 (1985); Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350,
339 N.E.2d 907 (1975); Unah v. Martin, 676 P.2d 1366 (Okla. 1984).
Seven jurisdictions have disavowed the doctrine except in those cases where
the parent's alleged tortious act involves an exercise of parental authority over
the child or ordinary parental discretion regarding educational matters or issues
of food and care: Turner v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786 (Iowa 1981); Rigdon v. Rigdon,
465 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. App. 1970); Black v. Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634 (Me. 1979);
Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972); Foldi v. Jeffries, 93 N.J.
533, 461 A.2d 1145 (1983); Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. 1971);
Goller v. White, 20 Wis.2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
28 Rousey, 528 A.2d at 416.
- Id.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 420.
32 Id. at 421. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 859G comment k (1979).
3 See Robertson & Paltrow, supra note 15.
4 Rousey, 528 A.2d at 423.
35 Id. at 422.
3 Id. at 423.
31 Id. at 420.
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quility. Indeed, what is seen here is a simple action by two sets of parties
- parent and child - to recover money damages from an insurance
carrier. A fund for the child's medical care and support is then created
without extinguishing other family assets. Thus, there is no real adver-
sary action between parent an child when insurance is involved.38
Judge Nebeker's almost obsessive concern with the principle of family
unity in Rousey is, indeed, commendable. The tragedy which the dissent
fails to appreciate is that the nuclear family exists no more - expecially
at the lower socioeconomic level of society.39 Biologic parents must be
held accountable for negligent or willful actions which injure their chil-
dren. The flexibility of the Restatement's position serves as a reasonable
framework for testing the limits to which liability will be imposed.
III. STABILITY, CONFUSION OR CHANGE
Illinois was one of the first jurisdictions to consider whether liability
for negligence could be imposed on third parties who cause prenatal injury
to a fetus.40 In 1953, the Illinois Supreme Court overruled itself and held
that a cause of action was warranted under the state's wrongful death
statute for the death of an infant who, while viable, sustained prenatal
injury owing to the negligence of a third person.41 Three years later in
Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital,42 the court rejected viability as a neces-
sary requirement of a successful action for prenatal injuries suffered by
a fetus due to the negligence of third persons.43
In contrast, the Illinois Supreme Court, in Stallman v. Youngquist,
rejected any legal cause of action either by or on behalf of a fetus -
subsequently born alive - against its mother for an unintentional infl-
iction of prenatal injuries.44 This conclusion was reached without ruling
on the status of the doctrine of parental immunity in Illinois. In Stallman,
the plaintiff suffered prenatal injuries during an automobile accident that
occurred while her mother was nine months pregnant. The action was
maintained on behalf of the plaintiff, Lindsay Stallman, by her father
and next of kin.
45
In Stallman, the plaintiff claimed that her right to recover damages
for prenatal injuries against a negligent third party was support for al-
lowing her a cause of action against her mother under similar circum-
stances.46 The plaintiff placed heavy reliance upon a Michigan Court of
Appeals case, Grodin v. Grodin,47 which had held that a mother incurred
-8Id. at 420, 421.
39 Rick, A Generation Alters Notion of U.S. Family: Census Reports Reflect
Dramatic Changes, Wash. Post, Sept. 5, 1989, at 12, col. 1.
40 Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900) (The court refused
to impose tort liability on a third party who negligently injured a fetus.).
41 Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953).
42 67 Ill.2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977).
4 Id. at 357, 367 N.E.2d at 1255.
-Stallman v. Youngquist, 125 Ill.2d 267, 531 N.E.2d 355 (1988).
"Id.
4Id. at 274, 531 N.E.2d at 358.
47 Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 400, 301 N.W.2d 869, 870 (1980).
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the same liability for negligent misconduct which resulted in prenatal
injury to her child as did a negligent third party.48 The Stallman court
declined to follow the Michigan Court of Appeals decision in Grodin and
concluded that "if a legally cognizable duty on the part of pregnant women
to their developing fetuses is to be recognized, the decision must come
from the legislature .. .
Several interesting policy reasons for the refusal to impose maternal
liability were articulated by the Stallman court. Central to the court's
decision was a concern with the unprecedented judicial intrusion and
scrutiny into the privacy and autonomy of pregnant women.
50
Holding a mother liable for the unintentional infliction of pre-
natal injuries subjects to State scrutiny all the decisions a
woman must make in attempting to carry a pregnancy to term,
and infringes on her right to privacy and bodily autonomy.
51
Further, if a fetus were granted assertable legal rights to a sound mind
and body which were enforceable against its mother, the law "would make
a pregnant woman the guarantor of the mind and body of her child at
birth. '52 The Stallman court recognized that the law has never imposed
a legal duty upon a woman to guarantee the mental and physical health
of her infant. The court feared that if such a duty were imposed, any and
all conduct "which negatively impacted fetal development would be a
breach of the pregnant woman's duty to her developing fetus. Mother and
child would be legal adversaries from the moment of concept until birth.
53
As admirable as the Stallman court's position may be, this decision
forecloses the possibility of imposing tort liability against the child's
mother. The judicial system's task of redressing the harm inflicted upon
a developing fetus by a pregnant woman's use of alcohol or controlled
substances thus becomes even more difficult. A deterrent effect upon other
mothers is also precluded. If a child may seek recovery for injuries inflicted
upon it by a third person as a fetus because such injuries interfere with
its "legal right to begin life with a sound mind and body,"5 4 why should
a fetus be prohibited from recovering against its mother for negligently
inflicted prenatal injuries?55
Id. at 401, 301 N.W.2d at 870. (The court recognized two exceptions to this
general rule. It stated that a child may not maintain an action against a parent
when the alleged negligent act involves an exercise in reasonable parental au-
thority or reasonable parental discretion with respect to the basic physical ne-
cessities of life. Id. at 396, 402, 301 N.W.2d at 870.
49 125 fI1. 2d at 280, 531 N.E.2d at 360.
Id. at 279-80, 531 N.E.2d at 360.
51 Id. at 278, 531 N.E.2d at 360.
52 Id. at 276, 531 N.E.2d at 359.
SId.
-Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924, 927 (Okla. 1976); Womack v. Buchhom,'384
Mich. 718, 725, 187 N.W.2d 218, 222 (1971); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 364-
65, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (1960).
In Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 301 N.W.2d 869 (1980), the court
held that the liability of a mother for negligent conduct resulting in prenatal
injury was the same as that of a negligent third party.
1989-90]
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Public policy supports the imposition of tort liability in fetal abuse
cases. Tort liability is not simply a consequence of the removal of parental
immunity. Such liability draws support from the contractual duties im-
posed in the context of surrogate motherhood. The conduct of a pregnant
woman who uses drugs is more than a failure to exercise reasonable care;
it is reckless. In egregious cases of maternal abuse, the price that such
behavior extracts from society justifies the imposition of criminal liability.
IV. THE SURROGATE MOTHER
A. Duties
Historically, a fetus was unable to maintain a cause of action for in
utero injuries because, as a part of the mother, no legal duty was owed
to one not yet in being.56 In 1939, the first case was recorded which allowed
for recovery for prenatal injuries.57 A later case established viability as
a necessary element to a cause of action. 58 Recovery was subsequently
extended to nonviable fetuses in Kelly v. Gregory.59 The Kelly court held
that when a child is born alive, it is entitled to obtain relief for any
prenatal injuries sustained by it any time after the point of conception
owing, as such, to another's negligent conduct. 60
A child's right to maintain a legal action against the surrogate mother
whose negligent behavior resulted in prenatal injuries should not be
hindered or barred by the parent-child immunity doctrine. The surrogate
mother's contractual agreement to carry the infant for the ultimate ben-
efit and consideration of the contracting parents imposes upon her a much
higher standard of care than that imposed socially and legally upon a
biological mother fulfilling the traditional child-bearing role. Indeed, the
surrogate's behavior during her pregnancy is obviously of great concern
to the contracting parents and focuses directly upon the best interest of
the embryo/fetus.
In fact, a surrogate mother's contractual duties directly benefit the
unborn child. The intent of the parties is to remove external, controllable
risks and produce a healthy child. Thus, the child is an intended third-
party beneficiary of the contract between the biologic mother and pro-
Dietrich v. North Hampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884) (Holmes, J.). The first case
to hold a woman liable for homicide in the death of her own fetus may soon be
decided in Massachusetts. A pregnant woman who drove her automobile while
intoxicated has been charged with vehicular homicide stemming from an accident
that resulted in the death of her fetus. For purposes of maintaining a charge of
vehicular homicide under the state statute, a viable fetus needs to have been in
existence - as here. Daly, Woman Charged in Death of Own Fetus in Accident;
Massachusetts Vehicular Homicide Case a First, Wash. Post, Nov. 25, 1989, at
A4, col. 1.
57 Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App.2d 629, 92 P.2d 678, reh'g denied, 33 Cal.
App.2d 629, 93 P.2d 562 (1939).
Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
5 282 A.D. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953).
Id. at 544-45, 125 N.Y.S.2d at 698.
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spective adoptive parents. The surrogate mother assumes an affirmative
and unabridgeable duty to act reasonably and thus promote or insure the
best interests of the fetus at the very moment of her impregnation. Con-
sequently, any subsequent injury which is proximately caused by a breach
of that duty should result in the imposition of liability against the sur-
rogate for her negligent conduct.
6 1
The duties set forth in the surrogate mother situation, i.e. to maintain
proper nutrition, to obtain proper medical care, and to abstain from smok-
ing, alcohol and drugs, should be imposed upon all pregnant women. The
same concerns that generated the surrogate mother's contractual duties
are shared by society as a whole, namely the birth of a healthy child.
The harms to be prevented - a physically or mentally handicapped child
and the societal costs of caring for this child - justify imposition of
liability.
As noted previously, surrogate mother contracts normally prohibit
the surrogate from smoking, drinking alcohol and using illegal drugs.
The surrogate may also be obliged to undergo amniocentesis, electronic
fetal monitoring or even a Cesarean delivery. In reality, the conditions
of a surrogate mother contract are almost impossible to enforce.6 2 The
needed surveillance for both monitoring and enforcing such conditions
would almost surely require round-the-clock supervision.
B. Causation
Although evidentiary proofs of causation are obviously going to be
difficult in fetal abuse cases, they are not insurmountable. To establish
a negligence claim, the legal cause of injury must be traceable to the
wrongful actions of another; the legal cause need not be the sole or the
predominant cause of injury.6 3 Instead, the plaintiff need only show that
the offending conduct is a substantial or material factor causing the
injury.I
It would be of limited value to pursue a cause of action for breach of
one or more of the provisions of the surrogate mother contract. Quite
simply, a minor breach of behavioral restrictions are unlikely to lead to
a clearly identifiable health problem in the subsequently born child. This
type of uncertainty in the evidentiary chain would cloud the ability to
assess legal damages.6 5 Even if the surrogacy contract contained a liq-
uidated damages clause, recovery under such a provision would not be
61 See Rothenberg, Baby-M, the Surrogacy Contract, and the Health Care Profes-'
sional: Unanswered Questions, 16 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 113, 117-18 (1988).
See also In re Baby M, 107 N.J. 140, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988); Smith, The Baby M
Decision: Love's Labor Lost, 16 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 121 (1988).
62 Charo, Legislative Approaches to Surrogate Motherhood, 16 LAw, MED. &
HEALTH CARE 96, 97 (1988).
r- See Day v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 328 So.2d 560 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1976).
64 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 430 comment d (1965).
- Id.
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permitted unless the liquidated damages can be shown to have some
degree of reasonable relationship to the harm caused by the breach.
66
A specific performance provision in a surrogate contract also raises
a number of complex issues. The enforcement of such a provision could
trigger assertions that individual privacy rights, personal autonomy and
bodily integrity would be seriously compromised.6 7 Yet, it has been sug-
gested that regardless of any contractual provisions, a pregnant surrogate
may well have inherent non-contractual duties to prevent harm to a fetus
she is carrying. Thus, the surrogate's personal right of autonomy and
"right" to breach the conditions of any surrogacy contract are limited.6
It is true that not all women who become surrogate mothers possess
the same level of intelligence or sophistication. However, liability is not
to be premised upon the surrogate's lack of knowledge or understanding,
but rather, liability is imposed because the surrogate failed to acquire
the knowledge necessary to produce a healthy child.69 Thus, it is no de-
fense for a surrogate to assert that she was unaware of the consequences
of smoking, drinking, or other harmful acts. Quite simply, knowledge is
expected of an individual who serves as a surrogate mother, whether or
not expressly provided for in the contract or imputed to her by reason of
her status. "The surrogate exhibits negligent behavior by failing to ac-
quire the knowledge which is an essential part of her task as a surrogate
mother."
70
Similarly, a woman who chooses to carry a child must acquire the
knowledge necessary to produce a healthy child. Society requires that a
woman adhere to basic safeguards - such as refraining from drugs,
alcohol or tobacco and obtaining regular medical care. Behaviors that are
almost certain to result in harm to the unborn child should provide a
basis for tort liability.
V. CRIMINAL LIABILITY
A. Culpable Behavior
Jennifer Johnson recently became the first American mother to be
convicted of delivering illegal drugs to her children through her umbilical
cord.7 1 She was found guilty by Seminole County Circuit Judge O.H. Eaton
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in Sanford, Florida, of delivering crack cocaine to a minor - her son
Carl, born in 1987, and a daughter Jessica, born in 1989.72 Ms. Johnson
was subsequently sentenced to fifteen years of probation and ordered to
complete a drug treatment program.
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While some civil libertarians bemoan this judicial decision as an
unconstitutional invasion of privacy and stress that education and im-
proved social services for pregnant women are the only ways to combat
pre-birth abuse,7 4 others suggest that fetal abuse be recognized in egre-
gious cases as a crime.7 5 "The desirability of post-birth sanctions should
depend on the gains to children relative to the harms that might arise
from such a policy.' '76 Given the distressing fact that some 375,000 babies
are born each year that have been exposed to drugs in the womb by their
biological "mothers," surely this is reason enough to extend child abuse
and neglect laws to include newborns. If a court can impose a duty in
prenatal injury actions upon the father of an unborn infant for willfully
failing to furnish necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical attention
for his child,77 it is reasonable to place a mother within the same zone of
responsibility. In turn, this can serve as a basis for subsequent criminal
prosecution.78 The balance is thus tipped in favor of benefiting new life
at the cost of penalizing women who, for whatever reasons, have failed




Fears of "pregnancy police" and over-zealous prosecutors infringing
upon women's rights are an overreaction. "Prosecution is essential to
properly motivate these people in order for them to see the benefits of
treatment," observed Paul Longii the State Attorney of Winnebago
County, Illinois.8 Sadly, many of the young women - who, in actuality,
are but girls in their early teens - defy educational opportunity and
advancement.
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More serious consideration should be given to sterilizing those women
who prove themselves to be repeated child abusers through drug addiction
and other willful acts.8 1 Just as a conviction for statutory rape has
brought, in lieu of sentencing, an agreed sterilization,8 2 courts should act
(with or without personal agreement or acquiescence) to prevent contin-
ued tragedies of birth where egregious cases of maternal negligence or
culpable behavior have clearly shown that a woman is not deserving of
the dignity and moral recognition of a true mother.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The fear of intrafamilial disruption and/or dissolution as a conse-
quence of adopting maternal liability for fetal abuse are greatly exag-
gerated. In the case where legal recovery would be allowed, the "family"
unit is simply not in existence. The biological mother carries only that
status - and not that of a loving, devoted, moral mother. Tragically, in
cases of substance abuse, the mother and embryo-fetus have indeed be-
come adversaries at the moment of conception - for an educated, loving
and caring woman would not allow herself to continue such a course of
action.
To disregard the coordinate responsibility attendant to the procreative
right of autonomy under the guise of the prenatal immunity doctrine
would demean the whole status of motherhood, the family, and thus,
society. A framework for addressing the problem of fetal abuse may be
constructed through the use of Section 895(G) and Comment k of the
Second Restatement of Torts" together with the utilization of a simple
balancing test. The gains to the child would be weighed against the harm
to the child's mother as a consequence of adopting such a policy.8 5
The level of personal dignity accorded each member of society is con-
tingent upon a level of full membership in a moral community - for the
social contract each has within that community creates duties and obli-
gations and a level of responsibility upon breach of that agreement. A
pregnancy may well have been unwanted, an accident. A mother may
well be unwilling - because of drug addiction and circumstances of life
- to make the unequivocal and necessary commitment to care for and
respect her fetus. Nonetheless, such circumstances do not relieve a mother
81 See Comment, Sterilization: A "Remedy for the Malady" of Child Abuse?, 5
J. CONTEMP, HEALTH L. & POL'Y 245 n.1 (1989) discussing Debra Ann Williams,
a mother who agreed to sterilization after pleading guilty to involuntary man-
slaughter in the starvation death of her twelve week old son.
82 People v. Blankenship, 161 Cal. App.2d 606, 61 P.2d 352 (1936).
m See generally Smith, Limitations on Reproductive Autonomy for the Mentally
Handicapped, 4 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 71 (1988).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 32.
See Robertson & Paltrow, supra note 15.
1 Comment, supra note 79. See also Smith, Limitations on Reproductive Au-
tonomy for the Mentally Handicapped, 4 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'y 71 (1988).
(Vol. 3:2
1989-90] ESSAY - FETAL ABUSE 235
of her responsibility. A woman has little valid right to assert an invasion
of her privacy rights and/or violation of autonomy when she knowingly
jeopardizes or even permanently injures her fetus.
In cases where education of such women is beyond the pale and there
is a reasonable expectation, based on their socioeconomic and intellectual
background and past record to expect repeat performances, sterilization
should be considered a viable option. Harsh though such proposed actions
may be, the undeniable fact is that women who wish the honor and
responsibility of motherhood - actual or surrogate - must act reasonably
and responsibly in the nurturing of the embryo-fetus. Courts must be free
to meet the challenge and the responsibility of dealing with one of the
most threatening socio-legal problems of the century by imposing civil
and criminal sanctions upon pregnant women who clearly fail to adhere
to minimum standards to insure the health of their children.

